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/*
* Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
*
* See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
* information regarding copyright ownership.
*/
#ifndef DNS_DNSSEC_H
#define DNS_DNSSEC_H 1
/*! \file dns/dnssec.h */
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <isc/lang.h>
#include <isc/stdtime.h>
#include <isc/stats.h>
#include <dns/diff.h>
#include <dns/types.h>
#include <dst/dst.h>
ISC_LANG_BEGINDECLS
LIBDNS_EXTERNAL_DATA extern isc_stats_t *dns_dnssec_stats;
/*%< Maximum number of keys supported in a zone. */
#define DNS_MAXZONEKEYS 32
/*
* Indicates how the signer found this key: in the key repository, at the
* zone apex, or specified by the user.
*/
typedef enum {
dns_keysource_unknown,
dns_keysource_repository,
dns_keysource_zoneapex,
dns_keysource_user
} dns_keysource_t;
/*
* A DNSSEC key and hints about its intended use gleaned from metadata
*/
struct dns_dnsseckey {
dst_key_t *key;
bool hint_publish; /*% metadata says to publish */
bool force_publish; /*% publish regardless of metadata */
bool hint_sign; /*% metadata says to sign with this key */
bool force_sign; /*% sign with key regardless of metadata */
bool hint_remove; /*% metadata says *don't* publish */
bool is_active; /*% key is already active */
bool first_sign; /*% key is newly becoming active */
unsigned int prepublish; /*% how long until active? */
dns_keysource_t source; /*% how the key was found */
bool ksk; /*% this is a key-signing key */
bool legacy; /*% this is old-style key with no
metadata (possibly generated by
an older version of BIND9) and
should be ignored when searching
for keys to import into the zone */
unsigned int index; /*% position in list */
ISC_LINK(dns_dnsseckey_t) link;
};
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdata_t *rdata, isc_mem_t *mctx,
dst_key_t **key);
/*%<
* Creates a DST key from a DNS record. Basically a wrapper around
* dst_key_fromdns().
*
* Requires:
*\li 'name' is not NULL
*\li 'rdata' is not NULL
*\li 'mctx' is not NULL
*\li 'key' is not NULL
*\li '*key' is NULL
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*\li DST_R_INVALIDPUBLICKEY
*\li various errors from dns_name_totext
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_sign(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
isc_stdtime_t *inception, isc_stdtime_t *expire,
isc_mem_t *mctx, isc_buffer_t *buffer, dns_rdata_t *sigrdata);
/*%<
* Generates a RRSIG record covering this rdataset. This has no effect
* on existing RRSIG records.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'name' (the owner name of the record) is a valid name
*\li 'set' is a valid rdataset
*\li 'key' is a valid key
*\li 'inception' is not NULL
*\li 'expire' is not NULL
*\li 'mctx' is not NULL
*\li 'buffer' is not NULL
*\li 'sigrdata' is not NULL
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*\li #ISC_R_NOSPACE
*\li #DNS_R_INVALIDTIME - the expiration is before the inception
*\li #DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED - the key cannot sign this data (either
* it is not a zone key or its flags prevent
* authentication)
*\li DST_R_*
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_verify(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx,
dns_rdata_t *sigrdata);
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_verify2(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx,
dns_rdata_t *sigrdata, dns_name_t *wild);
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_verify3(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *set, dst_key_t *key,
bool ignoretime, unsigned int maxbits,
isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_rdata_t *sigrdata, dns_name_t *wild);
/*%<
* Verifies the RRSIG record covering this rdataset signed by a specific
* key. This does not determine if the key's owner is authorized to sign
* this record, as this requires a resolver or database.
* If 'ignoretime' is true, temporal validity will not be checked.
*
* 'maxbits' specifies the maximum number of rsa exponent bits accepted.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'name' (the owner name of the record) is a valid name
*\li 'set' is a valid rdataset
*\li 'key' is a valid key
*\li 'mctx' is not NULL
*\li 'sigrdata' is a valid rdata containing a SIG record
*\li 'wild' if non-NULL then is a valid and has a buffer.
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*\li #DNS_R_FROMWILDCARD - the signature is valid and is from
* a wildcard expansion. dns_dnssec_verify2() only.
* 'wild' contains the name of the wildcard if non-NULL.
*\li #DNS_R_SIGINVALID - the signature fails to verify
*\li #DNS_R_SIGEXPIRED - the signature has expired
*\li #DNS_R_SIGFUTURE - the signature's validity period has not begun
*\li #DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED - the key cannot sign this data (either
* it is not a zone key or its flags prevent
* authentication)
*\li DST_R_*
*/
/*@{*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_findzonekeys(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver, dns_dbnode_t *node,
dns_name_t *name, isc_mem_t *mctx,
unsigned int maxkeys, dst_key_t **keys,
unsigned int *nkeys);
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_findzonekeys2(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver,
dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_name_t *name,
const char *directory, isc_mem_t *mctx,
unsigned int maxkeys, dst_key_t **keys,
unsigned int *nkeys);
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_findzonekeys3(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver,
dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_name_t *name,
const char *directory, isc_stdtime_t now,
isc_mem_t *mctx, unsigned int maxkeys,
dst_key_t **keys, unsigned int *nkeys);
/*%<
* Finds a set of zone keys.
* XXX temporary - this should be handled in dns_zone_t.
*/
/*@}*/
bool
dns_dnssec_keyactive(dst_key_t *key, isc_stdtime_t now);
/*%<
*
* Returns true if 'key' is active as of the time specified
* in 'now' (i.e., if the activation date has passed, inactivation or
* deletion date has not yet been reached, and the key is not revoked
* -- or if it is a legacy key without metadata). Otherwise returns
* false.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'key' is a valid key
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_signmessage(dns_message_t *msg, dst_key_t *key);
/*%<
* Signs a message with a SIG(0) record. This is implicitly called by
* dns_message_renderend() if msg->sig0key is not NULL.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'msg' is a valid message
*\li 'key' is a valid key that can be used for signing
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*\li DST_R_*
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_verifymessage(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg,
dst_key_t *key);
/*%<
* Verifies a message signed by a SIG(0) record. This is not
* called implicitly by dns_message_parse(). If dns_message_signer()
* is called before dns_dnssec_verifymessage(), it will return
* #DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET. dns_dnssec_verifymessage() will set
* the verified_sig0 flag in msg if the verify succeeds, and
* the sig0status field otherwise.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'source' is a valid buffer containing the unparsed message
*\li 'msg' is a valid message
*\li 'key' is a valid key
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*\li #ISC_R_NOTFOUND - no SIG(0) was found
*\li #DNS_R_SIGINVALID - the SIG record is not well-formed or
* was not generated by the key.
*\li DST_R_*
*/
bool
dns_dnssec_selfsigns(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_name_t *name,
dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset,
bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx);
bool
dns_dnssec_signs(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_name_t *name,
dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset,
bool ignoretime, isc_mem_t *mctx);
/*%<
* Verify that 'rdataset' is validly signed in 'sigrdataset' by
* the key in 'rdata'.
*
* dns_dnssec_selfsigns() requires that rdataset be a DNSKEY or KEY
* rrset. dns_dnssec_signs() works on any rrset.
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnsseckey_create(isc_mem_t *mctx, dst_key_t **dstkey,
dns_dnsseckey_t **dkp);
/*%<
* Create and initialize a dns_dnsseckey_t structure.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'dkp' is not NULL and '*dkp' is NULL.
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*/
void
dns_dnsseckey_destroy(isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_dnsseckey_t **dkp);
/*%<
* Reclaim a dns_dnsseckey_t structure.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'dkp' is not NULL and '*dkp' is not NULL.
*
* Ensures:
*\li '*dkp' is NULL.
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys(dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory,
isc_mem_t *mctx, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keylist);
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_findmatchingkeys2(dns_name_t *origin, const char *directory,
isc_stdtime_t now, isc_mem_t *mctx,
dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keylist);
/*%<
* Search 'directory' for K* key files matching the name in 'origin'.
* Append all such keys, along with use hints gleaned from their
* metadata, onto 'keylist'. Skip any unsupported algorithms.
*
* Requires:
*\li 'keylist' is not NULL
*
* Returns:
*\li #ISC_R_SUCCESS
*\li #ISC_R_NOTFOUND
*\li #ISC_R_NOMEMORY
*\li any error returned by dns_name_totext(), isc_dir_open(), or
* dst_key_fromnamedfile()
*
* Ensures:
*\li On error, keylist is unchanged
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset(dns_name_t *origin,
const char *directory, isc_mem_t *mctx,
dns_rdataset_t *keyset, dns_rdataset_t *keysigs,
dns_rdataset_t *soasigs, bool savekeys,
bool publickey,
dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keylist);
/*%<
* Append the contents of a DNSKEY rdataset 'keyset' to 'keylist'.
* Omit duplicates. If 'publickey' is false, search 'directory' for
* matching key files, and load the private keys that go with
* the public ones. If 'savekeys' is true, mark the keys so
* they will not be deleted or inactivated regardless of metadata.
*
* 'keysigs' and 'soasigs', if not NULL and associated, contain the
* RRSIGS for the DNSKEY and SOA records respectively and are used to mark
* whether a key is already active in the zone.
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_updatekeys(dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keys, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *newkeys,
dns_dnsseckeylist_t *removed, dns_name_t *origin,
dns_ttl_t hint_ttl, dns_diff_t *diff, bool allzsk,
isc_mem_t *mctx, void (*report)(const char *, ...));
/*%<
* Update the list of keys in 'keys' with new key information in 'newkeys'.
*
* For each key in 'newkeys', see if it has a match in 'keys'.
* - If not, and if the metadata says the key should be published:
* add it to 'keys', and place a dns_difftuple into 'diff' so
* the key can be added to the DNSKEY set. If the metadata says it
* should be active, set the first_sign flag.
* - If so, and if the metadata says it should be removed:
* remove it from 'keys', and place a dns_difftuple into 'diff' so
* the key can be removed from the DNSKEY set. if 'removed' is non-NULL,
* copy the key into that list; otherwise destroy it.
* - Otherwise, make sure keys has current metadata.
*
* If 'allzsk' is true, we are allowing KSK-flagged keys to be used as
* ZSKs.
*
* 'hint_ttl' is the TTL to use for the DNSKEY RRset if there is no
* existing RRset, and if none of the keys to be added has a default TTL
* (in which case we would use the shortest one). If the TTL is longer
* than the time until a new key will be activated, then we have to delay
* the key's activation.
*
* 'report' points to a function for reporting status.
*
* On completion, any remaining keys in 'newkeys' are freed.
*/
isc_result_t
dns_dnssec_syncupdate(dns_dnsseckeylist_t *keys, dns_dnsseckeylist_t *rmkeys,
dns_rdataset_t *cds, dns_rdataset_t *cdnskey,
isc_stdtime_t now, dns_ttl_t hint_ttl, dns_diff_t *diff,
isc_mem_t *mctx);
/*%<
* Update the CDS and CDNSKEY RRsets, adding and removing keys as needed.
*/
ISC_LANG_ENDDECLS
#endif /* DNS_DNSSEC_H */