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.\" ========================================================================
.\"
.IX Title "OCSP_RESP_FIND_STATUS 3"
.TH OCSP_RESP_FIND_STATUS 3 "2023-09-11" "1.1.1w" "OpenSSL"
.\" For nroff, turn off justification.  Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
.if n .ad l
.nh
.SH "NAME"
OCSP_resp_get0_certs, OCSP_resp_get0_signer, OCSP_resp_get0_id, OCSP_resp_get1_id, OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at, OCSP_resp_get0_signature, OCSP_resp_get0_tbs_sigalg, OCSP_resp_get0_respdata, OCSP_resp_find_status, OCSP_resp_count, OCSP_resp_get0, OCSP_resp_find, OCSP_single_get0_status, OCSP_check_validity, OCSP_basic_verify \&\- OCSP response utility functions
.SH "SYNOPSIS"
.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
.Vb 1
\& #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
\&
\& int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status,
\&                           int *reason,
\&                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
\&                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
\&                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
\&
\& int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
\& OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx);
\& int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last);
\& int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason,
\&                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
\&                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
\&                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
\&
\& const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at(
\&                             const OCSP_BASICRESP* single);
\&
\& const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OCSP_resp_get0_signature(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
\& const X509_ALGOR *OCSP_resp_get0_tbs_sigalg(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
\& const OCSP_RESPDATA *OCSP_resp_get0_respdata(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
\& const STACK_OF(X509) *OCSP_resp_get0_certs(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
\&
\& int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
\&                           STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs);
\&
\& int OCSP_resp_get0_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
\&                       const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
\&                       const X509_NAME **pname);
\& int OCSP_resp_get1_id(const OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
\&                       ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
\&                       X509_NAME **pname);
\&
\& int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
\&                         ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd,
\&                         long sec, long maxsec);
\&
\& int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
\&                      X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
.Ve
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
\&\fBOCSP_resp_find_status()\fR searches \fBbs\fR for an \s-1OCSP\s0 response for \fBid\fR. If it is
successful the fields of the response are returned in \fB*status\fR, \fB*reason\fR,
\&\fB*revtime\fR, \fB*thisupd\fR and \fB*nextupd\fR.  The \fB*status\fR value will be one of
\&\fBV_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD\fR, \fBV_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED\fR or
\&\fBV_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN\fR. The \fB*reason\fR and \fB*revtime\fR fields are only
set if the status is \fBV_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED\fR. If set the \fB*reason\fR field
will be set to the revocation reason which will be one of
\&\fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS\s0\fR, \fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED\s0\fR,
\&\fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE\s0\fR, \fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE\s0\fR,
\&\fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED\s0\fR, \fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED\s0\fR,
\&\fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION\s0\fR,
\&\fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD\s0\fR or \fB\s-1OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL\s0\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_count()\fR returns the number of \fB\s-1OCSP_SINGLERESP\s0\fR structures in \fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0()\fR returns the \fB\s-1OCSP_SINGLERESP\s0\fR structure in \fBbs\fR
corresponding to index \fBidx\fR. Where \fBidx\fR runs from 0 to
OCSP_resp_count(bs) \- 1.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_find()\fR searches \fBbs\fR for \fBid\fR and returns the index of the first
matching entry after \fBlast\fR or starting from the beginning if \fBlast\fR is \-1.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_single_get0_status()\fR extracts the fields of \fBsingle\fR in \fB*reason\fR,
\&\fB*revtime\fR, \fB*thisupd\fR and \fB*nextupd\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_produced_at()\fR extracts the \fBproducedAt\fR field from the
single response \fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_signature()\fR returns the signature from \fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_tbs_sigalg()\fR returns the \fBsignatureAlgorithm\fR from \fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_respdata()\fR returns the \fBtbsResponseData\fR from \fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_certs()\fR returns any certificates included in \fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_signer()\fR attempts to retrieve the certificate that directly
signed \fBbs\fR.  The \s-1OCSP\s0 protocol does not require that this certificate
is included in the \fBcerts\fR field of the response, so additional certificates
can be supplied in \fBextra_certs\fR if the certificates that may have
signed the response are known via some out-of-band mechanism.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_id()\fR gets the responder id of \fBbs\fR. If the responder \s-1ID\s0 is
a name then <*pname> is set to the name and \fB*pid\fR is set to \s-1NULL.\s0 If the
responder \s-1ID\s0 is by key \s-1ID\s0 then \fB*pid\fR is set to the key \s-1ID\s0 and \fB*pname\fR
is set to \s-1NULL.\s0 \fBOCSP_resp_get1_id()\fR leaves ownership of \fB*pid\fR and \fB*pname\fR
with the caller, who is responsible for freeing them. Both functions return 1
in case of success and 0 in case of failure. If \fBOCSP_resp_get1_id()\fR returns 0,
no freeing of the results is necessary.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_check_validity()\fR checks the validity of \fBthisupd\fR and \fBnextupd\fR values
which will be typically obtained from \fBOCSP_resp_find_status()\fR or
\&\fBOCSP_single_get0_status()\fR. If \fBsec\fR is nonzero it indicates how many seconds
leeway should be allowed in the check. If \fBmaxsec\fR is positive it indicates
the maximum age of \fBthisupd\fR in seconds.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_basic_verify()\fR checks that the basic response message \fBbs\fR is correctly
signed and that the signer certificate can be validated. It takes \fBst\fR as
the trusted store and \fBcerts\fR as a set of untrusted intermediate certificates.
The function first tries to find the signer certificate of the response
in <certs>. It also searches the certificates the responder may have included
in \fBbs\fR unless the \fBflags\fR contain \fB\s-1OCSP_NOINTERN\s0\fR.
It fails if the signer certificate cannot be found.
Next, the function checks the signature of \fBbs\fR and fails on error
unless the \fBflags\fR contain \fB\s-1OCSP_NOSIGS\s0\fR. Then the function already returns
success if the \fBflags\fR contain \fB\s-1OCSP_NOVERIFY\s0\fR or if the signer certificate
was found in \fBcerts\fR and the \fBflags\fR contain \fB\s-1OCSP_TRUSTOTHER\s0\fR.
Otherwise the function continues by validating the signer certificate.
To this end, all certificates in \fBcert\fR and in \fBbs\fR are considered as
untrusted certificates for the construction of the validation path for the
signer certificate unless the \fB\s-1OCSP_NOCHAIN\s0\fR flag is set. After successful path
validation the function returns success if the \fB\s-1OCSP_NOCHECKS\s0\fR flag is set.
Otherwise it verifies that the signer certificate meets the \s-1OCSP\s0 issuer
criteria including potential delegation. If this does not succeed and the
\&\fBflags\fR do not contain \fB\s-1OCSP_NOEXPLICIT\s0\fR the function checks for explicit
trust for \s-1OCSP\s0 signing in the root \s-1CA\s0 certificate.
.SH "RETURN VALUES"
.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
\&\fBOCSP_resp_find_status()\fR returns 1 if \fBid\fR is found in \fBbs\fR and 0 otherwise.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_count()\fR returns the total number of \fB\s-1OCSP_SINGLERESP\s0\fR fields in
\&\fBbs\fR.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0()\fR returns a pointer to an \fB\s-1OCSP_SINGLERESP\s0\fR structure or
\&\fB\s-1NULL\s0\fR if \fBidx\fR is out of range.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_find()\fR returns the index of \fBid\fR in \fBbs\fR (which may be 0) or \-1 if
\&\fBid\fR was not found.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_single_get0_status()\fR returns the status of \fBsingle\fR or \-1 if an error
occurred.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_resp_get0_signer()\fR returns 1 if the signing certificate was located,
or 0 on error.
.PP
\&\fBOCSP_basic_verify()\fR returns 1 on success, 0 on error, or \-1 on fatal error such
as malloc failure.
.SH "NOTES"
.IX Header "NOTES"
Applications will typically call \fBOCSP_resp_find_status()\fR using the certificate
\&\s-1ID\s0 of interest and then check its validity using \fBOCSP_check_validity()\fR. They
can then take appropriate action based on the status of the certificate.
.PP
An \s-1OCSP\s0 response for a certificate contains \fBthisUpdate\fR and \fBnextUpdate\fR
fields. Normally the current time should be between these two values. To
account for clock skew the \fBmaxsec\fR field can be set to nonzero in
\&\fBOCSP_check_validity()\fR. Some responders do not set the \fBnextUpdate\fR field, this
would otherwise mean an ancient response would be considered valid: the
\&\fBmaxsec\fR parameter to \fBOCSP_check_validity()\fR can be used to limit the permitted
age of responses.
.PP
The values written to \fB*revtime\fR, \fB*thisupd\fR and \fB*nextupd\fR by
\&\fBOCSP_resp_find_status()\fR and \fBOCSP_single_get0_status()\fR are internal pointers
which \fB\s-1MUST NOT\s0\fR be freed up by the calling application. Any or all of these
parameters can be set to \s-1NULL\s0 if their value is not required.
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
\&\fBcrypto\fR\|(7),
\&\fBOCSP_cert_to_id\fR\|(3),
\&\fBOCSP_request_add1_nonce\fR\|(3),
\&\fBOCSP_REQUEST_new\fR\|(3),
\&\fBOCSP_response_status\fR\|(3),
\&\fBOCSP_sendreq_new\fR\|(3)
.SH "COPYRIGHT"
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
Copyright 2015\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
.PP
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R").  You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.